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THE EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO
LEASES OF GOODS
In the present economic system, leases' are an increasingly preva-
lent form of acquiring the use and possession of personal property.2 As
such, leases have become a popular alternative to sales as a means of
structuring commercial transactions. Items that may be leased range
from such mundane things as folding chairs and baby diapers to highly
sophisticated computer systems. Equally diverse are the classes of per-
sons who participate in lease transactions; they include both business-
men and consumers.
Reasons for the rapid increase in the use of leases are as varied
as the parties and subjects of the transactions. For the more sophis-
ticated businessman, leasing provides an attractive alternative to an out-
right purchase because the timing of taxes can be controlled.8 The
flexibility available in lease transactions also permits tailoring risk and
benefit allocations to different financing arrangements. Further, the
use of a lease as opposed to an installment sale, or secured financing
agreement, allows a lessee's credit to remain open for other uses.4
Similarly, leasing may provide the only means that an individual with
poor credit can utilize to secure possession of a particular item.5 Fi-
nancial considerations, however, are not the only reason for choosing
the alternative of leasing; frequently the decisive factor is simply the
temporary need for a durable item.
1. References made in this comment to leases or lease transactions include only
those whose subject matter fulfills the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of
"goods", U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1972). [Hereinafter all references are to the 1972 version
of the Code.]
2. Boothe, The Practical Pros and Cons of Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
3. Amounts paid by the lessee are deductible to the extent they are an ordinary
and necessary business expense. I.R.C. § 162(a) (3). If these payments produce an
equity interest for the lessee, no business expense deduction will be allowed, although
a depreciation deduction may be available. Landis, Tax Aspects of Leasing, 79 CoM.
L.J. 8 (1974).
4. Dean, The Economics of Equipment Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 33.
5. S. REP. No. 590, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONO. & A. NEWS 433.
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ARTICLE-2 AND LEASE TRANSACTIONS
Since many purposes are served by leases, the specific terms of
individual lease agreements may vary greatly. The rights transferred
to the lessee can range from bare possession for a limited period of
time to complete ownership subject to a disguised security interest.6
Other rights and duties that may be allocated by a lease include options
to purchase, renewals and such incidents of ownership as personal
property tax liability and the duty to maintain and preserve the leased
goods.
As with any contract, the allocation of rights and duties created
by a lease arrangement is determined by the language of the agree-
ment. 7 Even so, no contract can exist in isolation; its language must
be supplemented by rules which supply matters omitted in a particular
contract, determine contract formation and construction, and specify
the consequences of breach. Because of the similarity of sales and
leases, however, it is not always clear which transactions ought to be
governed by the law of sales and which by the law of leases. Ob-
viously, the choice of law depends on the characterization given a par-
ticular transaction. Unless the distinction is made on the basis of form
rather than substance, the line separating leases from sales must fre-
quently be vague and elusive.
Traditionally, sales and leases have been distinguished by the
presence of one of two mutually exclusive factors: the obligation to
return the thing possessed, indicating a lease, or the eventual passage
of title, indicating a sale.8 When the occurrence of either factor is con-
ditional, the distinction becomes arbitrary and difficult to make. For
example, an obligation to return the thing delivered becomes less
meaningful when the transaction includes an option to purchase. If
the option can be exercised for nominal consideration, the obligation
is insignifioant.' Likewise, attention to the passage of title can also be
6. All aspects of transactions relating to security interests in goods are governed
by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, regardless of any disguise. U.C.C.
§ 9-102. However, a determination that Article 9 applies does not necessarily imply
that Article 2 is also applicable. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Over-
seas Corp., 346 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
7. Martin v. Wichita Cab Co., 161 Kan. 510, 170 P.2d 147 (1946); Metropolitan
Park Dist. v. Olympia Athletic Club, 42 Wash. 2d 179, 254 P.2d 475 (1953); Merchants
Leasing Co. v. Clark, 14 Wash. App. 317, 540 P.2d 922 (1975).
8. Stum v. Baker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893); West v. Backus, 97 Or. 116, 189 P.
645 (1920); see also Annot. 17 A.L.R. 1421 (1922).
9. Compare In re Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 475 (S.D.
Cal. 1966) ("debtor's 'only sensible course' was 'to become the owner of the goods' ")
with In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 794 (W.D. Mich. 1967) (option
cost greater than current list price).
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misleading. For example, retention of a security interest in a sale can
result in title passing to the secured party on default of the debtor,10
a result identical to that of a lease.
Apart from these two factors, the line between leases and sales
still can become blurred. For example, when the term of possession
in a lease equals the useful life of the leased item, the location of title
is irrelevant to the economic positions of the parties."
Of course, in the majority of cases the distinction between a sale
and lease is not difficult to make and, arguably, justifies leaving well
enough alone. Based on the premise that leases and sales are merely
separate points on the same continuum, however, this article advocates
the extension of Article 2 to leases. Such an extension will benefit
both the practicing attorney and the logical symmetry of the law. The
extent to which Article 2 should apply to leases and the method utilized
to accomplish the extension will also be considered.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND ARTICLE 2
In 1942, the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws undertook the joint prepara-
tion of a uniform act to cover the general area of commercial law.' 2
This action was taken for a variety of reasons. While a number of uni-
form acts were in existence,13 their adoption had been piecemeal.1 4
Moreover, commercial practices had undergone rapid development
since these acts were drafted.' 5 Finally, local amendment and di-
vergent construction of the acts had defeated actual uniformity."8
To prevent the piecemeal passage of related uniform acts, the
Code was designed as a unit, integrating all the different facets of a
commercial transaction. This design was predicated upon the belief
that all aspects of a commercial transaction were but a single subject
10. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) authorizes the secured party to retain the collateral in satis-
faction of the debtor's obligation upon written notice of such proposal.
11. In re Lakeshore Transit-Kenosha, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 607 (E.D. Wis.
1969).
12. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws & American
Law Institute, General Comment, in 1 UN FoRM LAws ANNOTATED XVII (1976)
[Hereinafter cited as General Comment].
13. Id. at XVI.
14. Beers, The New Commercial Code, 2 Bus. LAW. 14 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Beers].
15. Bunn, The Uniform Commercial Code-Some General Observations, 1952 Wis.
L. REv. 197 [hereinafter cited as General Observations].
16. Beers, supra note 14, at 14, 15.
[Vol. 12:556
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ARTICLE 2 AND LEASE TRANSACTIONS
of law.17  To keep in step with developing business practices, the views
of industry and business were solicited to draft a pragmatic, workable
act. Indeed, for some, certainty and clarity were higher goals than
theoretical perfection.18  Above all, passage and uniformity in all
American jurisdictions were considered fundamental objectives.' 9
Article 2 is the specific area of the Code dealing with the transfer
of ownership in goods. As such, it was designed largely to supplant
the Uniform Sales Act,2" although significant changes were made.
Primarily, these changes were in keeping with the increased emphasis
upon functionalism. Although often producing results similar to those
reached under the Sales Act, the Code rules were designed to be more
workable. 2'
One of the most fundamental changes brought about by Article
2 was a decreased reliance on the concept of title.22 Pre-Code law
relied on the title theory,23 whereby the location of title determined
the rights and duties of the parties. Article 2 sought to avoid the
practical problems inherent in the title theory by assigning contractual
rights and duties without relying on the location of title in the trans-
action. 24  Despite the de-emphasis of the title concept, it appears to
remain an indispensable aspect of the sales article,25 since Article 2 re-
mains primariy restricted to transactions in which title to goods is trans-
ferred.
The scope of Article 2 begins expansively: "Unless the context
otherwise requires, this article applies to transactions in goods .... ,, 1
The two key components of this provision are the terms "transactions"
and "goods". The Code definition of "goods '27 follows the common
17. Report of the Council to the House of Delegates on the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 7 Bus. LAw. 2 (1951).
18. Beers, supra note 14, at 14.
19. General Comment, supra note 12, at xv.
20. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code--Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59
YALE LJ. 821, 834 (1950).
21. Braucher, McCurdy, Sutherland & Kaplan, Report on Article 2-Sales by Cer-
tain Members of Faculty of Harvard Law School, 6 Bus. LAw. 151 (1951).
22. Report of the New York Law Revision Committee, Panel Discussion on the
Uniform Code, 12 Bus. LAw. 49 (1956).
23. Hall, Article 2-Sales--'-From Status to Contract"?, 1952 Wis. L. Rnv. 209.
24. U.C.C. § 2-101, comment states: "The legal consequences are stated as follow-
ing directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting to the idea
of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor."
25. 1 A. SQurmLANTE & J. FoNsECA, WILLSTON ON SALES § 5-7 (4th ed. 1973).
26. U.C.C. § 2-102.
27. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
1977)
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law definition of personal property28 and excludes money, investment
securities and choses in action. If only the term "transactions"2 9 is con-
sidered, the scope of Article 2 would seem to include leases of personal,
property. However, this apparently extensive coverage is restricted by
the definitions given other basic terms 0 used throughout the Code. As
defined, these terms clearly eliminate nonsales transactions from the
scope of Article 2, since the term "sale" incorporates the requirement
of transfer of title into its definition."1 As a result of the use of the
definition of "sale" in defining other terms and in the substantive pro-
visions of the Code, the requirement of transfer of title seeps into every
comer of the Code.32
Treatment of the concept of title in Article 2 therefore appears
basically inconsistent.3  On the one hand, the sales provisions are to
be applied "irrespective of title"' 4 while, on the other, the very ap-
plication of the sales article is dependent on the passage of title. 8 The
only logical conclusion seems to be that while the application of Article
2 does not depend on the actual time at which title passes, the passage
of title at some point nonetheless remains an absolute requirement.
The requirement of passage of title in Article 2 does not mean that
its drafters considered and rejected the Article's application to all non-
sales transactions. On the contrary, the applicability of Article 2 to
leases does not appear to have been considered. At the time the
28. Personal property traditionally has been defined as that which is movable. R.
BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7 (2d ed. 1955).
29. This term is not defined in the Code, but see WmsTmB's NEw INTERNATIONAL
DIarnoNARY 2688 (2nd ed. 1950) (transact: "To carry on business; to have deal-
ings. .... ).
30. U.C.C. §§ 2-101 through 2-107.
31. Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus.
LAw. 847 (1969); Comment, Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
to Leases, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 90.
32. The requirement of the transfer of title is explicit in the definition of "sale";
"A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price ......
U.C.C. § 2-106(1). The same requirement is then incorporated into the terms of "con-
tract" and "agreement", which terms are "limited to those relating to the present or
future sale of goods." Id. The definitions of "buyer" and "seller" are then based
upon the existence of a sale or contract to sell, U.C.C. § 2-103(1). Even the defini-
tion of "goods" incorporates the idea of passage of title; the term is defined as "all
things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
." U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
33. No less an authority than Samuel Williston notes this inconsistent treatment
in Article 2. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARv. L. REV. 561, 566 (1950).
34. U.C.C. § 2-401.
35. This is because the requirement of passage of title is incorporated so extensively
throughout Article 2. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 21 (1970).
560 [Vol. 12;,556
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Article was being drafted, leases of personal property occurred less fre-
quently than today.3" Problems arising from the requirement of the
passage of title were unapparent at the time and the natural tendency
of the drafters was to speak in terms of sales. Problems arose only
in connection with the precise moment of passage and Article 2 re-
jected the title concept only insofar as necessary to solve these prob-
lems.
Today, however, the intentions of the parties, even as to the
eventual passage of title, are much more likely to be unclear. Amid
the possible combinations of options to purchase, renewals of the lease
term and open-ended leases, the characterization of the intended trans-
action concerning goods is not only difficult, but subject to change during
the evolution of the transaction. Whether the applicable law should
be subject to change at any given moment because of the present ap-
pearance of the transaction is questionable. In fact, the very difficulty
of distinguishing sales and leases suggests that the application of dif-
ferent sets of rules is unjustified. Even when no question exists as
to the proper characterization of the transaction, if the economic in-
cidents are the same as those of a sale, the law should not distinguish
between the two.
APPLICATION BY THE COURTS
The extension of the scope of Article 2 to include leases has been
considered increasingly by the courts. However, because the question
has arisen in a judicial context, extension has only been considered in
regard to a particular section or sections. The purpose of the following
discussion is to present those Article 2 provisions which already have
been applied to leases. Some general observations will be made con-
cerning the relevance of specific Code sections to leases and the order
of discussion will roughly correspond to the frequency with which ex-
tension has been considered.
Code sections most frequently applied to lease transactions are
those concerning warranties.37 Not surprisingly, this area is also one
36. See I. MARAsH, TEATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES § 189 (1930) ("A rare and
unusual type of transaction is the lease of personal property, a form of agreement used
largely in the shoe machinery industry.").
37. U.C.C. § 2-312 (warranty of title); U.C.C. § 2-313 (express warranties);
U.C.C. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); U.C.C. § 2-315 (implied war-
ranty of fitness for particular purpose); U.C.C. § 2-316 (exclusion or modification
of warranties); U.C.C. § 2-317 (cumulation and conflict of warranties); U.C.C. § 2-
318 (third party beneficiaries of warranties).
'1977]
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in which the concept of extension has been most intensively scruti-
nized.38 This commentary has been overwhelmingly favorable because
of the policy interests favoring uniform treatment of transactions in
goods. In both a sale and a lease, the buyer/lessee is interested in
obtaining the use of certain goods, while the seller/lessor is interested
in providing the goods to be used.89 The particular circumstances in
each case, which determine whether the transaction takes the form of
a sale of a lease, do not change the reason for implying warranties.
The reliance of the user on the quality and safety of the items furnished
is as great in a lease as in a sale. As a result, the Code sections on
warranties have been applied in a wide variety of contexts. 40
Part 6 of Article 241 contains provisions governing the acceptance
or rejection of goods and each party's duties in either event. These
provisions have been found applicable to leases in a number of in-
stances. Sections requiring notification of breach,42 granting the right
to adequate assurance of performance,4' and defining the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation 44 have all been applied to lease transactions.
Courts have noted that the standards of conduct called for by Part 6
are either based on the common law4" or phrased in terms of reason-
ableness4 Thus, even where the court hesitates to find that the under-
lying transaction is governed directly by a particular Code provision, it
may simply apply the provision as the best available statement of the
law.4 7
38. See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 653 (1957); Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Spreading
Analogy]; Comment, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10
B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 127 (1968); Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a
Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 880 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Reasoning].
39. Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184,
1190 (1975).
40. See Annot. 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973) for a comprehensive list of examples where
the Code sections on warranties have been applied.
41. U.C.C. §§ 2-601 through 2-616.
42. U.C.C. § 2-607, applied in Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md.
277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974).
43. U.C.C. § 2-609, applied in Appeal of Productions Unlimited, Inc., 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 620 (Vet. Adm. Contract App. Bd. 1966).
44. U.C.C. § 2-610, applied in William B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d
262 (3d Cir. 1975).
45. Appeal of Productions Unlimited, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 620 (Vet. Adm. Contract
App. Bd. 1966); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28
(1974).
46. Appeal of Productions Unlimited, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 620 (Vet. Adm.
Contract App. Bd. 1966).
47. William B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.) (1975).
[Vol. 12:556
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1977] ARTICLE 2 AND LEASE TRANSACTIONS
Part 7 of Article 248 governs the remedies of parties to the sales
transaction. As might be expected, the most frequently applied pro-
visions are those dealing with the amount of damages recoverable.40
Other sections which have been applied are those dealing with cumu-
lative remedies50 and the statute of limitations. 1
The Article 2 provision granting courts the power to strike uncon-
scionable clauses and contracts52 has been held applicable in a number
of cases. "3 Extension of this provision has been urged on the ground
that it states a general principle of justice which transcends the area
of sales. 4 In the absence of such specific statutory authority, courts
must resort to various subterfuges to reach just results.55
The remaining sections of Article 2 which have been applied to
leases are found in Part 2,56 which contains general rules of contract
formation. These provisions have been applied in regard to the stat-
ute of frauds and writings in confirmation,5 7 the use of parole evi-
dence,58 and the modification of a contract.59 These provisions and the
others in Part 2 of the Article simply represent updated statements of
the general rules of contract law.
48. U.C.C. § 2-701 through 2-725.
49. U.C.C. H9 2-714 and 2-715, applied in KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp.,
327 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971), affd in part, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972);
Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 609 (Okla. App. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 P.2d 394 (1974); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277,
329 A.2d 28 (1974).
50. U.C.C. § 2-719, applied in Appeal of Productions Unlimited, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 620 (Vet. Adm. Contract App. Bd. 1966).
51. U.C.C. § 2-725, applied in Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 788
(Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975).
52. U.C.C. § 2-302.
53. Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654
(1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 346 N.Y.S.2d
288 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Lupiano, J., dissenting); United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin
Plaza Apart., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Fairfield
Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
54. In reference to § 2-302, Professor Corbin notes:
Where this section is made applicable to contracts for the sale of goods, no
court should fail to make it applicable to all other contracts; for the policy
it adopts is applicable to all alike, it puts upon the court the responsibility
for determining the degree of unconscionability and the requirement of "jus-
tice".
5 A. CoRmN, CoNTRAcTs § 1164, at 223 (1964).
55. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1. See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc.
2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
56. U.C.C. § 2-201 through 2-210.
57. U.C.C. § 2-201, applied in Miller v. Kaye, 545 P.2d 199 (Utah 1975).
58. U.C.C. § 2-202, applied in Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97
Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975).
59. U.C.C. § 2-209, applied in Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 293 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965).
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There are several rationales under which Article 2 has been ex-
tended to apply to leases. Under two of these theories, leases are as-
sumed to be directly within the scope of Article 2; two others extend
the scope of Article 2 by analogy. Because each theory is justified by
different considerations, each supports the application of the Code to
leases in varying degrees.
The first method under which leases are found directly within the
scope of Article 2 is employed in situations in which a transaction,
though labelled a lease, is in reality a sale. While such a facade is
not always easily detectable, the intent of the parties is so clear in some
instances that no other characterization of the transaction is possible.
An example of a transaction which justifies this treatment is a lease
agreement providing that upon expiration of the term of the lease title
to the goods automatically passes to the lessee. 0 By providing for
automatic passage of title, the purported lease fulfills the Code defini-
tion of a "contract for sale," which includes "a contract to sell goods
at a future time." 61 Once the self-serving label of a lease is disre-
garded, all Article 2 provisions should be applicable to the transaction.
The second method under which leases have been found directly
within the purview of Article 2 focuses on the language of the Article's
scope provision, which restricts the applicability of Article 2 to "trans-
actions in goods". 62 At least one court has reasoned that this phrasing
includes leases of goods, subject to express exclusion from specific pro-
visions.63 The approach thus emphasizes the breadth of the term
"transaction" and relies on the Code's purpose of de-emphasizing
title,64 requiring extension to be considered on a section by section
basis. Under this approach, extension is inappropriate only in regard
to a section that expressly incorporates the requirement of a sale.05
This rationale for extension is unjustified for two reasons. First,
this approach assumes that the drafters intended the scope of Article
60. This was the fact situation in Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Everett School,
Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 849 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
61. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
62. U.C.C. § 2-102.
63. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59
Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
64. 298 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
65. Such incorporation occurs in sections containing words such as "seller," "buyer,"
or "contract." See note 32 supra.
[Vol. 12:556
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2 to encompass more than outright sales, as suggested by the use of
the term "transaction". The number of provisions incorporating the
requirement of a sale belie this assumption and suggest that the use
of the term "transaction" was merely the result of inadvertent drafts-
manship. Secondly, assuming that the scope provision of Article 2 in-
deed was intended to be broader than the majority of its provisions, such
an approach is of minimal utility. The approach would preclude the
extension of most Article 2 provisions to leases, particularly those pro-
visions where extension would be most beneficial. 6
Extension by analogy has frequently been used to avoid the prob-
lems associated with express inclusion of leases within Article 2.
Courts utilizing this method concede that leases do not expressly fall
within the scope of Article 2 ,but they nevertheless apply its provisions
by analogy. Unfortunately, courts which have applied Article 2 to
leases "by analogy" have usually failed to distinguish between two dif-
ferent methods of analogizing leases to sales.
Under the first method, a court relies on the analogy that exists
between the lease in question and the paradigm of a sale; if the two
are sufficiently analogous, Article 2 is applied to the lease. 67  This
method must be distinguished from a similar method, discussed pre-
viously, of recognizing a disguised sale. Under the analogy method,
the transaction cannot be properly characterized as a sale; its functional
resemblance to a sale, however, requires similar treatment. Thus, the
crucial question is whether the lease is sufficiently analogous to a sale
to warrant the application of similar rules. In making such a deter-
mination, a number of factors are considered indicative of the func-
tional nature of transactions in goods. While these factors can be
identified, their presence and importance vary from case to case, mak-
ing it impossible to state any precise formula for predicting how a trans-
action will be classified.
One of the most important factors considered by the courts under
the analogy method is the presence of an option to purchase in a
lease.68  An option to purchase creates a potential contract for sale.
66. Note that all three warranty sections, U.C.C. §§ 2-313 through 2-315, contain
such terms and are among those most frequently applied. See text accompanying note
37 supra.
67. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968);
All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177, 1182 (1975).
68. The court in Mays v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602,




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss3/7
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
As a result, there is uncertainty whether sales law or lease law should
be applied to the transaction.69 If non-Code law is initially applicable
to the transaction and Code law is applied after the exercise of the
option, the result is the undesirable application of inconsistent rules to
different stages of the same transaction. If non-Code law is applied
to all stages of the transaction, the intended scope of Article 2 is frus-
trated. The only solution compatible with both uniformity and the in-
tent of the Code is the application of Article 2 to all stages of a trans-
action in goods containing an option to purchase.
In evaluating the weight to be given an option to purchase, logic
suggests that the lower the cost to the lessee of exercising the option,
the higher the probability that Article 2 will be applied to all stages
of the transaction. At some point, the cost of exercising the option
is so low that a court could find the lease is in fact a sale.70
A second important factor focused on by the courts is the length
of the lease term relative to the useful life of the item leased. The
greater the percentage of an item's useful life which a lessee will pos-
sess, the greater the liklihood that Article 2 will be applied.7' In
evaluating this factor, it is important to distinguish leases where there
is only a potential for a long or open-ended term from those whose
term is expressly defined as a major portion of the item's useful life.
In the latter case, the lessee is "locked in"; thus, the analogy of the
lease to the sale is clearer and exists at all stages of the lease.7 2
Other factors which have been considered by the courts include
identifying the party vested with the usual incidents of ownership, such
as the duty to repair and maintain the goods, the risk of loss and the
duty to pay personal property taxes.73 The position of the lessee more
closely resembles that of a buyer as he assumes more of these burdens.
69. E.g., in New York, where the statute of limitations for leases is six years,
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 213(2) (1971), would the Code's four-year statute of limita-
tions, U.C.C. § 2-725, bar an action for breach of warranty filed five years after breach
if, in the intervening period, an option to purchase had been exercised? Would the
result be different if the option had been exercised before the breach?
70. Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 293 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. 1965).
71. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 298
N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d
585 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
72. See Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10
(1975) (lessee obligated to either rent the item for its entire useful life or exercise
option to purchase).
73. Sawyer v. Pioneer easing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); All-
States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975).
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Similarly, a final factor considered in evaluating the particular trans-
action is the status of the lessor. If he is normally engaged in selling
the same item as that leased, or has previously offered to sell an item
that was later leased, there is an increased chance that the transaction
will be held analogous to a sale.74
The reasoning which underlies the application of Article 2 to an-
alogous lease transactions has been expressed in various ways. Some
courts have characterized the method as the recognition of a kind of
spillover effect: "[Tlhe Uniform Commercial Code Article on Sales
is attended by a penumbra or umbrella of influence in areas of contract
law not specifically within the literal definition of sales . . .,75
When the transaction in question is sufficiently analogous to a sale, it
falls within this penumbra of influence and Code law is applied. Im-
plicit in this position is the assumption that the scope of Article 2 is
not strictly confined to sales transactions. Rather, its scope extends to
the degree necessary to preserve the logical consistency of the law.
Other courts have focused on the practical effect of the transaction:
In view of the great volume of commercial transactions
which are entered into by the device of a lease, rather than
a sale, it would be anomalous if this large body of com-
mercial transactions were subject to different rules of law than
other commercial transactions which tend to the identical
economic result.76
No matter how the reasoning is expressed, courts which utilize this
first method of extension "by analogy" look beyond the legal form of
the transaction and examine its commercial substance. Cognizant of
the fact that one purpose of the Code is to make commercial law reflect
the realities of the market place, these courts appear wary of sub-
ordinating commercial practices to legal theory." However, these
courts are still somewhat confused as to which factors are relevant in
74. KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971).
75. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 346 N.Y.S.2d
288, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
76. Hertz Commercial Credit Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d
910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
77. See Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, -, 215 S.E.2d
10, 17 (1975) ("[W]e are attempting to prevent merchants from dodging the require-
ments of the UCC by selling goods under the guise of a lease . . ... "); United States
Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apart., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, -, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531,
535 (Civ. Ct. 1971) ("From the point of view of the user it makes little difference
that he is labelled a buyer or a lessee.").
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characterizing the commercial reality of a transaction. 7 By utilizing
this method of extension, these courts have, in a sense, "leapfrogged"
this theoretical lag while attempting to fulfill the purpose of the Code.
Principally because of this theoretical lag, the implications of this
method of extension are extremely vague. Logically, it appears that
a lease which is sufficiently analogous to a sale for the application of
one Article 2 provision should be sufficiently analogous to warrant the
extension of every other provision. In practice, however, this issue re-
mains far from settled. While some courts have applied a wide variety
of provisions to leases that were found to be analogous to a sale, 0 other
courts have expressly limited their application to specific provisions.8 0
The second method of extending Article 2 to leases "by analogy"
does not depend on the similarity of the particular lease to the para-
digm of a sale. Instead, this method is used in cases where the legal
principles of Article 2 are felt to be the best expressions of the law
which should be applied to leases.8' The analogy here is between
rules drawn from alternative sources of law:
Reasoning by analogy does not require us to apply Article
2 in toto to a lease; rather, we need apply only those provi-
sions which are sufficiently analogous. In order to deter-
mine which provisions are applicable we will look to the
commercial setting in which the problem arises and contrast
the relevant common law with Article 2-we will use Article
2 as "a premise for reasoning only when the case involves
the same considerations that gave rise to the Code provisions
and an analogy is not rebutted by additional antithetical cir-
cumstances.""2
Under this method many of the provision of Article 2 are viewed simply
as expressions of the general law of contracts.8 So viewed, their rele-
vance transcends the limited area of sales. Thus, even though found
in an Article whose scope is limited to sales, certain sections of the
Article have been held controlling, for practical reasons, in disputes re-
lated to bona fide leases.
78. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 74 Misc. 2d
898, -, 346 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
79. KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971).
80. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
81. All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, -, 538 P.2d 1177, 1182 (1975).
82. Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184,
1190 (1975) (quoting in part Judicial Reasoning, supra note 38, at 888).
83. "rhe Code, far from rejecting the foundations of prior contract law, in most
areas simply distills from the cases the most effective and desirable rules which it then
codifies in a clearly defined formulation." Judicial Reasoning, supra note 38, at 886.
See, e.g., Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, -, 538 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1975).
[Vol. 12:556
13
Wenzel: The Extension of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leas
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
ARTICLE 2 AND LEASE TRANSACTIONS
There are two reasons for turning to Code provisions under such
circumstances. First of all, non-Code law does not provide clear
answers to legal problems concerning leases. Very little statutory law
exists in the area of personal property leases"4 and case law governing
such leases often is sparse.85 This state of affairs leaves a dearth of
authority on many questions involving leases. When similar questions
have been answered by the Code, it is natural for courts to rely on such
answers. This tendency is encouraged by the fact that many Code pro-
visions draw a bright line between compliance and non-compliance.8 6
Others specilically allocate a right or duty where the law was previously
silent.8 7 In either case, while the provisions may be arbitrary in an
absolute sense, they are essential in providing the necessary certainty
for conducting daily business affairs. In the absence of definite rules,
different jurisdictions could adopt equally valid, but incompatible,
rules. Thus, even where a transaction falls outside the scope of a par-
ticular provision, courts, in the interest of certainty, have held code pro-
visions determinative.88
The second reason for turning to Article 2 provisions in these cir-
cumstances is that much relevant non-Code law has become outdated.
Here again, the absence of statutory provisions and recent case law is
a primary cause of this state of affairs. One of the purposes of the
Code was to update the law where business practices had outpaced ex-
isting legal principles.8 9  The fact that the scope of Article 2 was re-
stricted to sales does not justify the inference that the law for other
84. Usually personal property leases are governed by general statutory contract pro-
visions. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW ch. 24-A (McKinney 1964). When states
do engage in an occasional statutory foray into this area, the results are extremely
limited as compared with the Code. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1925-1935, 1955-
1959 (1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 531-545 (1972).
85. Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971) (rejection
of precedent from 1936).
86. E.g., an objection to the terms of a writing in confirmation must be given
within ten days, U.C.C. § 2-201(2), and, upon request, assurance of due performance
must be given within thirty days, U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
87. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-501 ("Insurable Interest in Goods"); and U.C.C. § 2-502
("Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency").
88. In William B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), the
court considered the application of the Code provision on anticipatory repudiation,
U.C.C. § 2-610. After first holding that the Code did not govern in the case of a
lease, the court followed the dictates of the provision, stating: "We know of no justifica-
tion or logic for applying a different rule to a contract which is outside the Code. ...
In reaching this conclusion we do no more than recognize a single rule of anticipatory
breach governing all contracts, within or without the Uniform Commercial Code." Id.
at 271.
89. See General Observations, supra note 15.
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transactions was intended to remain static. As a result, courts have
found justification in the Code to modernize outdated laws relating to
leases technically outside Article 2's scope. 90
It is important to keep in mind that the extension of Article 2 to
leases has not been universally accepted.91 Courts that have rejected
opportunities to extend the Code to lease transactions have anticipated
fundamental problems. One concern has been that by extending the
scope of Article 2 to leases, the judiciary would invade the legislative
function.92 While such concern is understandable, other courts have
taken the opposite tact, suggesting that the Code encourages judicial
extension.93 The introductory Code provision on rules of construction
and purpose seems to support this position and appears to provide an
internal growth mechanism. 94
A second major objection to the extension of Article 2 provisions
to leases is grounded on the fear of uncertainty and unpredictability
of results. If the line between a sale and a lease is blurred or
abandoned, where should the new line be drawn? Moreover, what as-
surances are there that the new line will be any clearer than the old
one? No definitive test has yet been proposed which yields consistent
results in this regard.95 In light of the many factors which must be
90. In Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971), the court
considered the effect of an innocuous disclaimer in the lease of a defective golf cart.
Under case law directly in point, such a disclaimer would avoid liability. Nevertheless,
the court adopted the Code provision nullifying such disclaimers, U.C.C. § 2-316(2),
as expressive of public policy and held the disclaimer void.
91. De Kalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (al-
ternative holding), affd on opinion below, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); Sawyer
v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (Fogleman, J., dissent-
ing); Mays v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614
(1974); Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 346 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
92. Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, -, 285 A.2d 607, 609 (1972) ("[m1f the draftsmen
had intended the sections [U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-3151 to apply to leases of goods as well
as to sales, they should have said so.") (footnote omitted). See also Sawyer v. Pioneer
Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968) (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
93. Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974); rev'd,
50 App. Div. 2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). See also Spreading Analogy, note
38 supra; Judicial Reasoning, note 38 supra.
94. U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1 begins:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to
be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery
for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for
the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of
unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.
95. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 56 (1968)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
15
Wenzel: The Extension of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leas
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
ARTICLE 2 AND LEASE TRANSACTIONS
considered, 90 a distinction based on any one factor would be at least
as arbitrary as the present distinction based on title. On the other
hand, any differentiation made on the basis of all the various factors
must be inherently subjective. Even so, while no greater certainty may
be possible, the choice of law should be made on the basis of substance
rather than form. 97
In any case, the question of which transactions come within the
scope of Article 2 is asked only in regard to specific sections. If the
volume of case reports is any indication, some provisions may be ex-
tended much more readily than others. The policy behind each pro-
vision is the controlling factor.98  This raises the problem of ascertain-
ing the policy behind each section. As a result, some courts have sug-
gested that piecemeal extension interferes too greatly with the Code's
objectives of certainty and predictability:
I am unable to discern how we will be able to decide the
application of code provisions to leases on a section by sec-
tion basis in the absence of clear statutory intent. Nor do
I see any guide to the trial bench or bar, much less to the
business community, in making these decisions. The pur-
pose of clarifying, stabilizing and making uniform the com-
mercial laws of the various states is thus defeated by creating
an atmosphere of confusion about the whole thing.99
PROPOSALS
Past extensions of Article 2 to leases have occurred in response
to a felt need for change; a need that appears widespread and likely
to increase. Substantial questions have been raised, however, concern-
ing the effect of extension and the fear of even greater uncertainty re-
sulting from increased extension of the Code. While no panacea can
be offered, two alternative proposals are presented.
The first suggestion is the incorporation of all leases within the
scope of Article 2. Such a modification would do away with the sale
requirement of the Code, without affecting the limitation of its ap-
plicability to "goods". 100 Simplicity and certainty would be the primary
96. See text accompanying notes 68 to 74 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 84 to 90 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
99. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 56 (1968)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
100. U.C.C. § 2-102 incorporates this dual requirement. See text accompanying
notes 26 to 31 supra.
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benefits of this change. Distinctions would no longer be necessary any-
where on the sales/lease continuum and all Article 2 provisions would
be applicable to leases. The only shortcoming of such a modification
is the danger of overextension; review of Article 2 reveals a few pro-
visions which might not be applicable to leases.10 1 Insofar as they are
truly inapplicable, little harm should result, however. Likewise, review
reveals no provision of Article 2 which, if applied to leases with com-
mon sense, would lead to an unjust result.'0 2 Nevertheless, not all fact
situations can be imagined in advance. The prospect of some peculiar
set of circumstances transforming an extended provision into a legal
Frankenstein cannot be lightly disregarded. 0 3
Insomuch as the proposal for complete incorporation of leases
within the scope -of Article 2 admittedly involves a large step, an alter-
native proposal is presented. This is a two-step process which employs
both forms of extension by analogy. To this extent, the proposal uti-
lizes practices which already are in use in varying degrees. However,
by applying them in a conscious, formal process, desirable results can
be reached that also provide certainty.
The first step would require the identification of all Article 2 pro-
visions which should be applied to all leases. In order to make this
determination, the inquiry should be the same as the second method
of extension by analogy used by the courts. Thus the Article 2 pro-
visions that should be applied to every lease of personal property should
include the vast majority of Article 2 provisions. Identified sections
could then be amended to reflect their applicability to leases.' 0 4  A
selection process conducted by the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code would enhance the likelihood of consistent
amendment. Certainty and predictability would be increased from the
present situation; whenever the question of the applicability of Article
2 to a lease arose, some provisions would definitely apply.
The second step would be used only in regard to those provisions
not expressly extended to all leases. For theie provisions, extension
101. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-326 deals with sales on approval and consignments; U.C.C.
§ 2-509 deals with risk of loss.
102. Some Article 2 provisions must be interpreted in a slightly different light. E.g.,
literal interpretation of the section on the measure of damages for seller's breach, U.C.C.
§ 2-714(2), might fail to adjust the level of damages to reflect the lessee's limited
temporal interest in the goods.
103. Consideration by committee, such as the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Commercial Code, would do much to lessen this possibility.
104. Specific extension would be provided for in a manner similar to that used in
U.C.C. § 2-314 to the serving for value of food or drink.
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would occur on a case-by-case basis. In considering the application of
these provisions to particular leases, courts would analyze the relevant
factors of the transaction and consider whether, in light of the provision
to be applied, the lease was sufficiently analogous to a sale to justify
application. The method used at this step is the same as the first
method of extension by analogy.
This method of extension attempts to serve two masters: uni-
formity and flexibility. Uniformity would be aided by making those
provisions of Article 2 most applicable to leases explicitly applicable.
Flexibility would be perserved by allowing further extension on a case-
by-case basis. The second step involving more difficult questions and
more subjective answers can be avoided in most cases. Further, be-
cause the process of selection under the first step would be a relatively
slow one, the second step would allow courts immediate freedom to
extend Article 2 where necessary.
CONCLUSION
Determining the applicable body of law to control questions aris-
ing in regard to leases of personal property is a problem encountered
with increasing frequency. When these questions arise, there is a
natural tendency for those familiar with the Uniform Commercial Code
to look to Article 2 for answers. The limited scope of the Article,
however, prevents universal reliance on the extension of its provisions
to leases.
While many provisions of Article 2 have been extended to leases,
extension has been only piecemeal. Inconsistent results and theories
have prevented the certainty and uniformity which are essential in com-
mercial law. To realize these objectives, therefore, it is imperative that
a clear and comprehensive body of law be developed for leases. In
light of the functional similarity between leases and sales, it is inevitable
that provisions of Article 2 will play a decisive role in the development
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